Saturday, January 12

Spanish police nab sailboat and cocaine cargo

Spanish police have seized 600 kilos (1,320 pounds) of cocaine on a sailboat in the Atlantic bound for Spain in a drugs operation that netted seven suspects, including three Europeans, police said Saturday.

The cocaine had been transferred to the British-registered sailboat off the coast of the island of Antigua in the Antilles, a police statement said.

Police, who had been following the sailboat since last month, intercepted it between the Portuguese islands of the Azores and Madeira and found on board 600 packets each containing a kilo of cocaine.

Three European crew members from France, Italy and Spain were arrested in the operation. Four others from Colombia, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, picked up by police in Madrid, are suspected of being responsible for the drugs network, police said.

Anti-narcotics officials believe Portugal and Spain have become the main points of entry into Europe for cocaine coming from Latin America.

In related news, a man claiming to be a Catholic priest was arrested Friday at Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport after he was caught carrying 3.5 kilograms of cocaine under his robes, a spokesman for Dutch border police said.

Peru's Fujimori stands trial for human rights abuses

Business man Samuel Dyer testified on Friday during the trial of former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori saying that he saw the president walk through the army base where he was being held captive. Fujimori is on trial facing charges of authorizing two death squads and ordering kidnappings of the businessman and a prominent journalist.

The Associated Press reports that Fujimori told the court that if there were abuses during his government, they were isolated acts and not his responsibility. He said he did not direct anti-insurgent operations, which were carried out by armed forces chiefs. Prosecutors are seeking to establish Fujimori's ties to military commanders.

"President, I've been kidnapped. Help me," Dyer said he shouted to Fujimori.

Dyer said Col. Alberto Pinto, then head of the army intelligence service, told him he was being held after officials received an anonymous phone call accusing Dyer of having connections to Marxist Shining Path rebels.

Related news:

New armed groups in Colombia threaten prospects for peace

For decades, Colombians have been caught in the crossfire between leftist guerillas (FARC, ELN) and right-wing paramilitary organizations. In 2003, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe signed a peace deal with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), the country’s largest paramilitary group, in an effort to initiate a transition from war to peace. Since then, over thirty thousand combatants have demobilized and requested legal, economic, and social benefits under the Justice and Peace Law of 2005 (Ley 975- in Spanish).

In early 2006, the Organization of American States (OAS) Peace Support Mission in Colombia (MAPP/OEA) and civil society organizations warned of a possible rearming of demobilized paramilitary groups and the merging of former paramilitary members with transnational criminal syndicates. Evidence has since emerged that these new armed groups also established relations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN). According to the March 2006 OAS report:

In regions where guerrilla activity is low and the entry of the forces of law and order has not been effective, conditions arise under which various armed illegal groups can assume control. In these areas, the problem arises when middle-level demobilized combatants step into the vacuum. They assume control of the criminal activities that were traditionally the preserve of the units or groups based there (extortion, levies on drug production, social cleansing, alliances with local administrations) and organize themselves into small groups, armed with side arms, remaining in urban areas and communicating by cell phones.

The report also points out:
There is a risk of demobilized sectors of the population being co-opted, and of new combatants being recruited. This phenomenon has emerged primarily in areas with consolidated illegal economies.

On January 11, 2008 Stephanie Hanson of the Council on Foreign Relations published "Colombia’s Right-Wing Paramilitaries and Splinter Groups," providing an insightful assessment of this developing situation. The report is available at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Related information:
In May 2007, the International Crisis Group published a similar report on the emergence of "Colombia's New Armed Groups" which urged the Colombian government to move beyond treating the groups as simple "criminal gangs" but as organizations requiring an urgent and comprehensive response.

For additional information on Colombia's illegal armed groups:
FARC, ELN, AUC Backgrounder (Council on Foreign Relations)

Photo by Jason P. Howe

Friday, January 11

National Human Trafficking Awareness Day

Today marks the first annual Human Trafficking Awareness day in the United States. This day intends to raise awareness and vigilance for the millions of victims of trafficking in persons across the globe.

Human trafficking happens all over the world. In the U.S., the Justice Department estimates at least 17,000 people are brought here each year and forced to work in slave-like conditions. Other groups say the number is higher. While estimating the number of victims to trafficking is very difficult, however it is considered to be the fastest-growing criminal industry in the world, projected to be worth about $32 billion.

For coverage of National Human Trafficking Awareness Day, visit National Public Radio.

Also on National Public Radio:

Trafficking in persons, also known as human trafficking, is considered to be a form of modern-day slavery. It is regarded to the second largest criminal industry in the world, after arms and drug dealing. Traffickers generate billions of dollars in profits every year while victimizing millions of people around the globe.

Trafficked persons are forced or coerced into labor or sexual exploitation. Under international law, all children who are commercially sexually exploited are considered trafficking victims, even if no force or coercion is used. Sex trafficking is one of the most lucrative sectors of the trade in people, and involves sexual exploitation in prostitution or pornography, bride trafficking, and commercial sexual abuse of children. Labor trafficking is widespread not only in situations of domestic servitude and small-scale labor operations, but also in sweatshops and farms that are subcontracted to major multinational corporations.

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reports that traffickers often lure their victims to the United States with promises of an arranged marriage, financial security or a job opportunity. Once in the clutches of traffickers, victims are often kept from running away by threats that escaping would bring harm to their families.

Related news:
For more information on trafficking in persons, visit Polaris Project.

Thursday, January 10

Hostages reunited with families (Spanish and English)



CNN Video:
Watch another video of the hostages' emotional reunion with family (in English).

Hostages arrive to Venezuela healthy and happy

After living for over six years as hostages of the FARC, helicopters carrying the two overjoyed women Clara Rojas and Consuelo González arrived to Santo Domingo airport in Táchira, Venezuela. The freed hostages were spotted by members of the press and are said to appear to be somewhat thinner but in good health.

Just minutes ago, González spoke with President Hugo Chávez, urging him to continue his efforts to free the hostages that remain in captivity. "You can't let your guard down," she said. "Those who remain would say that. We have to keep on working."

For live coverage (in Spanish) of this news story, visit Caracol Radio and click on "Echúchenos en vivo."

CNN Reports ---Helicopters carrying two freed Colombian hostages touched down in Venezuela on Thursday. Consuelo Gonzalez, a Colombian politician who has been in custody for more than 6½ years, and Clara Rojas, an aide to fellow hostage and former Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt. The rebels have not agreed to release Betancourt. The two women were freed by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known by their Spanish acronym FARC, in a deal brokered by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. After landing in the Venezuelan border town of Santo Domingo, they strode about 100 yards across the airport tarmac to a waiting jet, which took off a few minutes later for Caracas. Both women thanked Chavez in telephone conversations videotaped by the rescuers. "You're helping us, president, return to life, thank you, Mr. President," said Rojas.

Doctors had been standing but it did not appear that they were needed. "They appear well," said Terry Robins, a Red Cross representative who accompanied them on the trip. "They were smiling in the helicopter." Chavez announced the release at a news conference while the Red Cross helicopters were en route to a jungle location pickup point in Colombia. Yves Heller , a spokesman for the International Committee of the Red Cross, "I believe that it is a great day for these people. We are going to continue working for the victims of this conflict."

The FARC is a leftist insurgent force that has sought to overthrow the Colombian government since the late 1960s. It holds about 700 hostages in the jungles of Colombia. Last year, the group struck a deal with Chavez to release three of them -- Gonzalez, Rojas and Emanuel, Rojas' 3-year-old son by one of the rebels. FARC blamed a New Year's Eve collapse of the deal on Colombian military activity, but the Colombian government said that the rebels called off the deal because they didn't have Emanuel in custody -- the boy had been in foster care in Bogota for two years.

FARC has justified hostage-taking as a legitimate military tactic in a long-running and complex civil war that also has involved right-wing paramilitary units, government forces and drug traffickers. The group's captives include three U.S. contractors who were captured when their plane went down in 2003 during a drug-eradication flight.

Betancourt, a one-time French-Colombian independent presidential candidate, and Rojas were kidnapped in February 2002 after venturing into rebel-held territory. Juan Manuel Santos, Colombia's defense minister, told reporters he hoped that Thursday's operation turns out to be the first of many. "I hope that they continue liberating the hostages that they still have," he said. "This is only two of the 700 they have."

Video: Rebels hand over high-profile hostages to Red Cross



Hostages Clara Rojas and Consuelo González have been released to the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC). Today at approximately 11:47 am. Venuezuelan President Hugo Chávez announced that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) had released hostages Clara Rojas and Consuelo González. He added that he has spoken to them by telephone and that they are in good condition.

So why release these hostages?
While not confirmed, earlier reports speculated that perhaps Rojas and González were part of this current hostage release due to their failing health. The reports emphasized that the FARC wished to release the women in order that they might receive proper medical attention. I believe that this move actually supports my suspicions that the FARC, severely weakened in recent years by numerous military defeats and organizational deterioration, cannot provide adequate care for its ailing hostages while constantly on the lam from increased military pressure that is being applied by the Colombian armed forces.

This is joyful event for the hostages and their families that may offer signs of the conflict becoming unsustainble---especially for the FARC. A third-party mediator must act fast to take advantage of this important accomplishment by creating space for "secret talks" between the parties. Negotiations between the FARC and Colombian government will only end in disappointment if both parties cannot be convinced that the other side is negotiating in good faith. For this reason, the release of Clara Rojas and Consuelo González is an important first step because it shows that, at a minimum, such an operation can be carried out. It also demonstrates that a complex operation involving numerous international delegates and the demilitarization of vast territories (e.g. Florida and Pradera) is not necessarily required to carry out a successful humanitarian exchange. Though I remain cautiously optimistic, I do hope that in the coming months we will hear about the release of additional hostages and the parties engaging in "talks about talks."

Helicopters sent to recover hostages held by FARC

This morning two Venezuelan helicopters were dispatched to San José de Guaviare in southeast Colombia to recover hostages Clara Rojas and Consuelo Gonzalez. The hostages will be released somewhere between the communities of San José de Guaviare and El Retorno. Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos also reported that once the hostages have been released the rescue mission would provide time for the rebels to retreat into the mountainous countryside by waiting one hour before taking off and heading to Venezuela.

Wednesday, January 9

Colombian government authorizes hostage rescue operation

According to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, the coordinates indicating the whereabouts of hostages Clara Rojas (a hostage held by the FARC since 2002 and the mother of three-year-old Emmanuel) and Consuelo Gonzalez. The Colombian government has reportedly agreed to allow the Red Cross to carry out the rescue mission.

This is a crucial moment for these negotiations as any infractions by either party, real or perceived, will most certainly thwart the rescue mission. If the women are recovered and determined to be in good condition, this would signal that the FARC wants to be perceived as a legitimate negotiating partner and possibly that it wishes to pursue a negotiated settlement to the conflict. And while unilateral confidence-building measures like this one are not always reciprocated, they can serve as an important first step in creating the conditions necessary to initiate broader peace negotiations.

Hugo Chavez and his dubious role as hostage negotiator

Last week, the founder and chief of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) Pedro Antonio Marín, alias Manuel Marulanda and/or Tirofijo, announced a "general offensive" in a New Year message. He encouraged the guerrilla movement to take advantage of the alleged "crisis faced by the government and the tiredness shown by some military units to work on a general offensive," and he urged his subordinate commanders to "launch armed actions in roads, lanes, jungle, urban centers, villages and garrisons, with no truce for the enemy, as they do it."

In related news, the Colombian government announced on Monday that it would no longer authorize international humanitarian missions such as the one that late December arrived in Villavicencio to witness the failed delivery of three hostages held by the left-wing Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) to President Hugo Chávez. Colombian Minister of the Interior and Justice Carlos Holguín Sardi argued that, following the FARC's failure to meet their promise to release three hostages, "you cannot negotiate with cheaters and liars."

The following day, Colombian High Commissioner for Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo softened the Uribe Administration's position when he said that any future efforts by the international community to support the release of the hostages held by the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) should be based on "their reliance on the Colombian government, discrete operations, and efficient communication." This is good news because it serves to clarify the previous position that seemed to rule out any possibility of future mediation efforts led by international parties.

Some hardliners argue that Colombia ought to reject offers by "outsiders" to serve as mediators between the Colombian government and the FARC. Distrustful of his motives, some view Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's ongoing mediation efforts as a veiled interventionist strategy aimed at undermining Colombian sovereignty. Unfortunately, such rigid positions are unwise and may even be counterproductive to the negotiation process.

While Chavez may indeed possess ulterior motives, this might be used to break the current impasse. A strong argument can be made that the FARC finds itself in an untenable position, weakened by numerous military setbacks at the hands of the U.S.-backed Colombian armed forces and increasingly poor internal coordination. This last point became more evident in recent weeks as the group was unable to verify the whereabouts and locate Emmanuel, the three-year-old boy that the FARC had agreed to hand over to Chavez as part of a December hostage release. For more coverage of the proposed hostage release, click here.

And while the FARC might have indeed lied to Chavez about the hostage release or tried to "fool the international community" by offering to hand over a hostage that it did not have, something about this explanation fails to be convincing. Adam Isacson of the Center for International Policy posits that rather than trying to pull off an elaborate ruse, the FARC simply lost track of the boy due to its own incompetence.

This incompetence, combined with the reality that they no longer operate freely as they once did throughout much of the Colombian countryside, demonstrates that the insurgency is engaged in a costly and unsustainable predicament. Then again, the movement has been waging war for over 40 years and seems to possess vast reserves of patience and the capacity to wait out its current vulnerability through pursuing a strategy of playing not to lose rather than playing to win.

Assuming that the FARC does perceive that a military victory cannot be attained, it might choose to pursue an alternative approach in the place of a sustained armed conflict. It is therefore possible that the group will give up its weapons and engage in the political process if it could be convinced that doing so were worthwhile. That is precisely why Hugo Chavez plays such an important and beneficial role as the mediator. In fact, he and his leftist allies in the region might actually be the only parties capable of convincing the FARC to cease their armed struggle and instead seek power and influence through the ballot box. While we are still far from reaching this outcome, I am still hopeful that the parties will find a way to move past the current impasse. We shall see if President Chavez can facilitate this process by brokering a hostage release in the coming days and weeks.

Story of Colombian boy hostage emerges

The Miami Herald
By JENNY CAROLINA GONZALEZ

This town of 4,000 deep in Colombia's southern jungle, ironically named The Return, is where the boy now known as Emmanuel began his long journey from a guerrilla hostage to freedom. To Colombian government officials, neighbors and friends, he was a very sick child named Juan David Gómez Tapiero. But DNA tests showed he is almost certainly Emmanuel, born in captivity to a politician kidnapped by FARC guerrillas. His story created worldwide headlines when the FARC offered to release him, his mother, and another hostage to Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. But few people, including FARC leaders, knew at the time that the guerrillas no longer had the boy. A visit by The Miami Herald to this largely jungled region some 310 miles south of the capital city of Bogotá produced the first detailed account of Emmanuel's path from El Retorno to headline-maker, though many questions remain unanswered.

In early June 2005, José Crisanto Gómez, a 37-year-old peasant, arrived here by boat after a one-day trip from his tiny village of La Paz, according to several residents. La Paz was then under the control of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a leftist guerrilla group better known as FARC. Gómez arrived with two sickly children, seeking medical care for them. One, a boy of about 11 months, had what medical personnel here described as one of the worst health profiles they had seen: malaria, a broken arm, severe malnutrition, anemia, a high fever, diarrhea and leishmaniasis, a serious skin disease common in the jungle.

"It was depressing"
The public clinic here immediately transferred him to the hospital in the provincial capital, San José del Guaviare, only 17 miles but a 40-minute drive away. ''It is not common to receive children in the [bad] health that Juan David arrived,'' said Rosario Neira, director of the San José hospital. "It was depressing, everything that had come together on just one child. It made for sadness. Anyone would have fallen apart before this child, with so many diseases,'' she added. "He didn't raise his eyes. He got toys but did not pick them up. He did not stand but dragged himself on his butt. He cried but no tears came because of the malnutrition.''

Given what is now known about the boy, his poor health is not surprising. Emmanuel was born in a FARC jungle camp to one-time vice presidential candidate Clara Rojas, kidnapped by the rebels along with presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt nearly six years ago during a campaign trip to a rural area. The father was reported to be a rebel who had a consensual relationship with Rojas.

Similar accounts
One El Retorno resident who says José Crisanto Gómez told him the full story in confidence recalled that Gómez had said the boy was left in his care in La Paz by FARC fighters during a battle with Colombian army troops. The rebels promised to return for him in a week. A close friend of Gómez's wife, Liliana, 24, said she also was told that the FARC intended to leave the child for only a few days. The friend, who asked for anonymity because of concerns for her safety, added that the FARC wanted the child's broken arm treated by Liliana's stepfather, a folk healer.

"Just an instrument"
The friend and the El Retorno resident both insist that not until about two weeks ago did Gómez begin to suspect that the boy was the son of Clara Rojas. They also deny rumors that Gómez was a member of 12,000-strong FARC, Latin America's oldest and most powerful guerrilla group. ''He was just an instrument. What blame can he have if the only thing he did was lend a hand? Besides, it is a common practice for the guerrillas to leave their children in the care of other families,'' said one Gómez neighbor, who also asked to remain anonymous because of fear.

"They were very poor"
The boy remained with the Gómez family in La Paz for 30 to 45 days, according to the family friends. But seeing the boy's health worsening -- and one of his own sons ailing -- Gómez decided to make the trip to El Retorno with the two boys. Gómez apparently did not have the FARC's permission for the trip, the El Retorno resident said. And once he was there, the guerrillas threatened him. So the whole family -- Liliana, their six other children and Liliana's stepfather -- fled La Paz and moved to the El Retorno neighborhood of El Quindío, a poor section of dirt streets and houses made of zinc sheeting. ''They were very poor. Sometimes they had nothing to eat. When there were days when it was two in the afternoon and they had had no breakfast, I would give something to the youngest,'' said Liliana's friend. "The grandfather went often to the slaughterhouse to see if he could find some bones."

Desperate, Gómez took the ailing baby to the El Retorno's public clinic on June 15, saying that the boy was the son of a niece, Martha Tapiero, who had died. Emmanuel's health improved at the San José hospital, but the day after his arrival there he was declared a ward of the government's Colombian Institute for Family Welfare. On June 28, 2005 he was stable enough to be transferred to a government facility in Bogotá for treatment of his broken arm, malaria and leishmaniasis, according to Neira, the director of the San José hospital. "We sent him on [to Bogotá] because he required a superior level of care than we could offer here," Neira said.

Asked about a boy
In Bogotá, while recuperating from surgery on his arm, the child was placed with a foster family. But Gómez kept track of the boy through a Family Welfare official in San José, said Jhon Valdéz, who spoke to Gómez in his role as the El Retorno representative of the federal government ombudsman's office. "He knew where the child was and was very interested. The reason he could not go to see him was because he had no money," Valdéz told The Miami Herald. He added that Gómez not only wanted the child back because of the FARC, but because he had grown fond of the boy. Early last year, Gómez, then working in construction, made a failed attempt to win a seat on the El Retorno municipal council, saying he wanted to represent the thousands of peasants forced by the war to flee the countryside for more urban areas.

Threats
The Gómez family suffered another blow last April when Family Welfare officials ruled the boy had been abandoned, jeopardizing Gómez's ability to recover the child. The officials argued that Gómez was too poor to care for the child and had failed to prove that he was related to the boy. Gómez unsuccessfully appealed to Valdéz, the ombudsman. Last June, the FARC began to press him for the child's return. By November, the demands had turned into threats, and Gómez decided to try to get the boy back now claiming that he was the boy's father, Valdéz said. "He never told the FARC that the child was with [Family Welfare]," Valdéz said. "He told me that the boy was his life insurance, and that if he revealed where he was, they would kill him.''

Deadline
Valdéz said that on the afternoon of Dec. 26, after the FARC had given Gómez a Dec. 30 deadline to hand over the child, Gómez went to his office and revealed the whole story in confidence -- still unaware of the boy's true identity. By that time, Chávez had gathered a slew of international observers to supervise the hostages' release and sent several aircraft to the city of Villavicencio, on the edge of Colombia's jungle, to await the promised release of Emmanuel, his mother, and former Congresswoman Consuelo González. Valdéz said he counseled Gómez to turn himself in to authorities. Gómez agreed to but waited until Dec. 29 -- after he had received his monthly salary from his construction job. That afternoon, the family abandoned their house in El Retorno and went to San José. On December 31, Gómez, contacted other authorities who immediately called the police. He repeated his story, and the family is now under the government's witness protection program. The same day, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe announced that his intelligence agencies had received information that Emmanuel was not under FARC control and was likely the same boy under care of a foster mother in Bogotá.

Surprise
In El Retorno, the news that the hostage-boy Emmanuel had in fact lived among them surprised many of the residents. "Never did we imagine that child had been here," said restaurant manager Lorena Amado. "It's a good thing they found him. Maybe now," said Neira, the San José hospital administrator, "he will get all the love that he's been missing."

Saturday, January 5

Narco-submarines used for shipping tons of cocaine

On September 11, 2000, reports began to circulate regarding super-sized narco-submarine construction efforts underway in Bogota, Colombia, raising many incredulous eyebrows in the process. "They won't believe me in Washington," said Leo Arreguin, the surprised DEA director in Colombia, on stumbling upon the most spectacular findings of his career as an anti-narcotics agent. Arreguin had discovered a submarine 36 meters (118 feet) long and capable of transporting up to 15 tons of cocaine. "Never in my 32 years of police work have I seen something like this." According to police, the project was the result of efforts by Russian and Colombian mafias with ties to organized crime in the United States. Upon seeing the submarine, one Russian embassy official exclaimed, "This is technology from my country!"

Since 1994, traffickers have used mini-submarines to transport drugs, but Ismael Idrobo from the Colombian Naval Academy pointed out that never before had such a large vessel been discovered. Built in Bogota, the narco-submarine was to be dismantled into three sections and transported to Buenaventura, a seaside port located over 700 kilometers away. The vessel, weighing in at 150 tons, could have operated at depths of 100 meters (330 feet) and able to carry 10-15 tons of cargo while remaining submerged for over six hours at a time.

In 2003, the Spanish customs agency (SVA) reported that it suspected that mafias hailing from the northwest Spanish province of Galicia possessed submarines for carrying out their narcotics trafficking operations. At that time, the agency explained that Russian submarines had been up for sale and that narcotraffickers from various countries potentially could use them to evade counter-narcotics patrols. Then in 2006, Spanish police discovered a 10-meter long submarine near the Cies islands, close to the port city of Vigo. Not surprising, Vigo is an industrial city known for its long tradition of building submarines.

Since 2005, Colombia's navy has captured 18 homemade submarines. In November 2007, Colombian marines seized a makeshift submarine capable of smuggling up to 12 metric tons of cocaine through the Pacific to Central America. The vessel, under construction but nearly completed, was found in a rural area in south Nariño province and had enough space for four crew members. That same month, the Costa Rican Coast Guard announced that U.S. Coast Guards had seized a submarine carrying 3.5 tons of cocaine in the Pacific Ocean off Costa Rica and arrested three Colombians on board. In December, Colombian forces, backed by the U.S. Coast Guard, stopped an underwater craft that was then sunk by its crew members in order to destroy their incriminating cargo. Since then, another submarine was discovered on January 4. In both cases, the smugglers opened the hatches to sink the vessels before they could be boarded by authorities. Each of these submarines had the capacity to ship 10 to 12 tons of cocaine to the United States.

In 2008, look for more discoveries of these narco-submarines off the coast of Guinea-Bissau, the worlds' fifth poorest country and an increasingly important transit hub for Colombian narcotics smuggled to Europe.

DNA results confirm the identity of boy born in captivity

DNA results confirm the suspicions that the boy also known as "Juan David Gómez" and held in the custody of Colombian child welfare officials since 2005 is actually Emmanuel, the son of Clara Rojas. What is most damaging to the FARC's veneer of legitimacy is that he was to be one of the hostages released by the insurgents in mid-December.

In its statement released on Friday, the FARC charges that they had given the boy to "honorable" individuals in Bogota while the humanitarian accord was being worked out. The statement also asserts that "public opinion, both nationally and internationally, understands that Emmanuel could not remain in the middle of the combat operations of Plan Patriótica, including the bombings and combat and the eventualities of the jungle." The group says that the boy had been placed under the care of trusted individuals but was later abducted by President Uribe.

Political analyst Alfredo Rangel said Friday, "the FARC has recognized that they unsuccessfully attempted to deceive the national and international public opinion by wanting to hand over a hostage that was not in their custody." Ex-Commissioner for Peace Camilo Gómez added, "Ironically, it is a child that has done the most harm to the FARC. Who is going to believe them now?"

The fact that the FARC now accuses Uribe of sabotaging the release of hostages Clara Rojas, Emmanuel, and Consuelo Gonzalez, demonstrates just how the group is increasingly determined, and some might even say desperate, to improve its standing before public opinion and negotiate a political solution to the decades-long conflict. The conflict cannot be sustained indefinitely and is likely to end in a negotiated settlement. And rather than rushing to negotiate with the group, President Uribe has instead taken a "tit-for-tat" approach to negotiating with the FARC. Unlike past administrations that have approached the negotiating table prematurely, Uribe instead uses the intensification of military pressure to induce the negotiation process. The FARC has experienced significant losses in the past seven years and some analysts point out that the group is living on borrowed time. This latest debacle involving Clara Rojas and her son Emmanuel has undermined the strength of Hugo Chavez as a competent and reliable mediator and the FARC as a potentially trustworthy negotiating partner. The group has also lost a valuable face-saving opportunity to move towards the negotiating table, therefore look for the insurgents and Colombian armed forces to intensify their military incursions in 2008.

Friday, January 4

Colombian negotiations hinge on identity of three-year-old boy

Just when it appears that a group of hostages will finally be released by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Colombian negotiations suddenly unravel for one reason or another. The most recent episode of stalled negotiations hinge on resolving the mysterious identity of a three-year old boy named Emmanuel.

Clara Rojas was kidnapped by the FARC on February 23, 2002 along with presidential candidate Íngrid Betancourt as the two campaigned in southern Colombia. In April 2006, journalist Jorge Enrique Botero reported that Rojas had given birth to a child named Emmanuel that she had conceived through a consensual relationship with a FARC guerrilla. This story was later confirmed in April 2007 when police officer John Frank Pinchao escaped from the FARC and gave information to authorities regarding the birth of Rojas' son.

On December 18, 2007, the FARC announced that it would release three captives, Clara Rojas, her son Emmanuel, and former congresswoman Consuelo Gonzalez. However, since then numerous doubts have surfaced regarding the identity and whereabouts of Emmanuel. The FARC has also accused the government of intentionally sabotaging efforts to free the hostages by dispatching military personnel to the guerrilla-controlled areas.

After days of delays and accusations, Colombian President Álvaro Uribe announced on December 31 that he suspected that Rojas' son had actually been given to Colombian child welfare agents (ICBF) in June 2005 by a man claiming to be his great-uncle. Since then, the boy has undergone DNA testing to determine whether in fact he is the son of Clara Rojas. The test results are expected to be released on Friday.

Thursday, September 6

The end of summer and the beginning of a new academic year

After leaving behind Colombia and spending a few enjoyable days with friends and family in Minnesota, I have returned to my life as a second-year graduate student at The Fletcher School. In addition to catching up with old friends and meeting the new crop of first-year students, I have also spent the past several days poring over the latest Fall 2007 class schedule. While I am still somewhat undecided about which four courses to take this semester, I am leaning towards enrolling in the following classes.

International Human Rights Law
This is an introductory survey of international human rights law and procedures, including a detailed examination of global, regional, and national institutions to protect human rights. The course traces the development of contemporary concepts of human rights, including issues of universality, whether or not certain categories of rights have priority over others, and the means of creating and enforcing human rights law. The role of non-governmental organizations in fact-finding and publicizing human rights violations is also addressed.

Transitional Justice
This seminar will deal with the problems and challenges faced by any country which attempts to establish accountability for past abuses of human rights in the aftermath of mass atrocities. Students will first consider the various philosophical and moral issues associated with this subject. They will then analyze the major strategies and mechanisms available for the pursuit of post conflict justice including international ad hoc criminal tribunals, the International Criminal Court, the hybrid tribunals in Sierra Leone and East Timor, and informal mechanisms such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and mechanisms, like the gacaca process in Rwanda, which incorporates local custom. In addition, students will examine the challenges associated with the reconstruction of the domestic justice system in post conflict countries and will consider non-criminal sanctions and deterrents such as lustration and reparations.

Seminar on Peace Operations
Enthusiasm for peacekeeping has waxed and waned in recent years, from exuberance in the early 1990s to disappointment and disinterest in the mid-90s, back to cautious enthusiasm at the end of the decade, to what is now almost universal recognition that peace operations are an important strategic tool for the management of international peace and security. Between 1999 and 2007, 12 major UN peacekeeping missions were established, along with regional operations undertaken by NATO, the European Union, African Union, ECOWAS and various other organizations and coalitions. By one count, there were 40 UN and non-UN peace operations deployed in the year 2006. This course combines a thematic and case study approach to this complex aspect of contemporary international affairs. We will look at UN and non-UN peace operations, broadly defined to include peace-keeping, peace enforcement and post-conflict peace-building. We begin with a number of sessions on fundamentals: the UN Charter framework, history and types of peace operation, doctrine, functions and capacity. Select cases are then be studied, with a view to drawing out common themes and concerns, such as the problem of ‘spoilers’, the peace v. justice debate, the dilemmas of humanitarian action and the challenges of state-building. The course concludes with a series of student-led debates and discussions on the most recent missions, designed to draw on knowledge garnered from the cases, themes and issues studied earlier.

Evaluation of Peacebuilding and International Development
This course will explore core components of the program cycle, starting with social change theories that underpin program design and finish with strategies for learning at the project, institutional and field levels. The core concepts of design, monitoring and Evaluation (DME) will be applied primarily to international development and peacebuilding programming though humanitarian aid and its specific challenges will also be touched upon. Though a uniquely practical course, this class will also engage in organizational and donor government policy issues. The goal of this course is to acquaint students with the main conceptual themes in evaluation at the project level and its practical application. As such, the class will: start with a discussion of change as it pertains to designing programs that are evaluatable; discuss monitoring systems; focus on developing sound frameworks for evaluation; reflect on practical challenges, ethics and politics of evaluation; consider evaluation from differing units of analysis; reflect on the differences between development, peacebuilding and humanitarian evaluation.

And while this course load includes the writing of several long research papers and as a result promises to be quite challenging, I am excited about the possibility of taking classes that will really complement my recent experience working with IOM in Colombia.

Monday, August 27

Video: A quick tour of my Bogota apartment

My time in Colombia has come to an end

This will probably be my final blog entry from Colombia since today is my last day at IOM with internet access. During the past three months I have had a wonderful time working in Bogota and I have learned many valuable lessons about working in the field of international affairs. First, I have learned that getting your "foot in the door" of an international organization can be a little bit tricky and sometimes requires the help of friends, acquaintances, and kind-hearted strangers. I have also learned that while it can be exciting to live and work in an exotic locale such as Bogota, Colombia, sometimes the workload and tight deadlines can border on insane. Regarding the staff at IOM, I have learned that there are many hardworking and dedicated people striving everyday to make Colombia a better place for future generations. The staff here is absolutely phenomenal and I congratulate you on the wonderful things that you are doing.

I am grateful to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for allowing me this opportunity to work in such a fine organization. I would like to thank my co-workers for all their support -- especially my supervisors Catalina and Fernando. And while I am excited to see my friends and family again, I am also sorry to leave behind the many wonderful people that I have come to know in Colombia. You will definitely be missed.

So long, Colombia! Until next time...

Friday, August 24

Gustavo Moncayo controversy: Grieving father or rebel sympathizer?

Before Gustavo Moncayo became a household name he lived a quiet life in rural Colombia. Every day he would attend Catholic mass and walk just two short blocks to the public high school where he taught social studies. However, since making his “Forest Gump-like trek” across Colombia to draw attention to the “cruelty of kidnapping,” Moncayo has become a fixture of the evening news, has engaged in fiery public debates with President Álvaro Uribe, and has even been personally invited to meet with Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to discuss ways of resolving the hostage crisis.

This small, wiry man with a salt-and-pepper goatee wears silver chains draped across his shoulders and securely fastened to his wrists to symbolize the suffering of kidnapping victims and their grieving families. Frustrated by the government’s inability and unwillingness to negotiate for the release of his son, held hostage by the FARC for the past 10 years, Moncayo has even offered to exchange his own freedom for that of his son.

Gustavo Moncayo is an outspoken supporter of proposals that would demilitarize two towns in southwest Colombia for talks over the exchange of jailed rebels for more than 50 FARC-held hostages.

Opinion polls in Colombia show broad public support for President Uribe and his hard-line stance against negotiating with the Marxist rebels. Therefore it is not suprising that many people are quick to criticize Moncayo’s audacity to criticize the president and his policies. They seek to delegitimize Moncayo by labeling him as a “traitor” and “rebel sympathizer.” Why, just the other day I was among a large crowd that had gathered around Moncayo’s big white tent and temporary home in the Plaza Bolivar when a neatly dressed, gray-haired man passed through the crowd saying, “They are nothing but guerrillas in those tents! Traitors and guerrillas! You’re all traitors and guerrillas!”

I couldn’t help but question the logic of this outspoken critic. I asked myself, “Why would a father whose son has been held hostage by the guerrillas for the past 10 years be sympathetic of the guerrilla movement?” It defies logic, doesn't it? I also wondered what this gentleman would do if he were in Moncayo’s shoes and it was his son that was held shackled somewhere in middle of the Colombian jungle? Would he just sit back and happily support the president’s unwavering stance against negotiating with the FARC? Or would he also do whatever it took to free his son even if that meant walking from Bogota to...say, Washington D.C.? I would really like to know.

Photograph courtesy of Gustavo Moncayo.

Wednesday, August 22

NPR broadcasts story on Gustavo Moncayo

Captured by the FARC ten years ago, Gustavo Moncayo's son is among the hostages being offered up by the rebel group in the protracted negotiations between the Colombian government and Marxist insurgency movement. This past Father's Day, Moncayo left his home in southern Colombia and walked over 600 miles to the nation's capital in the hopes that he might persuade the government to work out a deal with the FARC and secure the release of his son.

Opponents of the prisoner exchange argue that negotiating with the FARC will only encourage the insurgents to capture more hostages in the future. Meanwhile, advocates point out that a prisoner exchange could build trust between the parties and facilitate future peace talks.

On August 21, National Public Radio broadcasted a story on Gustavo Moncayo and his inspiring "Walk for Peace."

Tuesday, August 21

Something new to add to my résumé?

Does this seem like something that I might add to my résumé under "Special Skills and Abilities?" Perhaps I could say something like this-

"Spearheaded the implementation of a weekly manual sanitation project that generated clean clothing for one individual and sucessfully reduced overhead expenses by more than $40 US dollars per month."

If it isn't quite clear what I am doing in the picture, that's me washing my clothes "old school."

Marulanda, this is Chávez speaking--I don't know you or where you might be, but I'm waiting for your signal

And with these words directed towards FARC leader Manuel Marulanda, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez expressed his desire to serve as an impartial "observer and guarantor" of negotiations between the FARC and Colombian government.

Yesterday during a meeting with family members of FARC-held hostages, Chávez spoke convincingly about the hostages' long-awaited release from captivity as something imminent rather than distant. In doing so he reinvigorated the hope of those in attendance for a successful negotiation and a much anticipated "humanitarian accord" between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

"From my heart, I ask [Colombian President] Álvaro Uribe to continue his support of this task. And I also ask that the guerrillas (FARC) give us a response. They will know how [to respond] – through 'other channels' that we have used in the past.”

The Venezuelan leader pointed out that both parties had to be willing to make concessions if they were to achieve the release of hostages. Furthermore, he reiterated his willingness to host the negotiations on Venezuelan territory.

Some argue that Chávez is just the person needed to build a workable trust between the two deeply divided parties. First of all, while his populist views and political rhetoric are not so popular in Washington, they are quite appealing to the FARC, a leftist revolutionary movement. Also, it has been pointed out that Chávez and Uribe seem to have mended their one-time rift and that they have been in "constant contact" over Chavez' possible role as mediator between the FARC and Colombian government.

Analyst Alberto Garrido points out that this recent development reveals a subtle shift in Uribe's hard-line position of refusing to negotiate with the FARC and demonstrates a more nuanced understanding of the need to achieve a negotiated agreement amidst growing national and international pressure.

Amongst those present during yesterday's meeting was Gustavo Moncayo, a humble high school social studies teacher that gained notoriety for his 1200 kilometer "Walk for Peace" across Colombia.

And if the FARC refuses to accept Chavez' offer? Well, then the FARC loses this round and Uribe stashes away yet another victory for the home team--a result that the FARC would absolutely detest. In my opinion, this looks like a very positive step forward in the Colombian peace process.

Photograph courtesy of EFE/El Tiempo

Wednesday, August 15

War profiteers "don't want war to end"

The following article about Salvatore Mancuso, a demobililized paramilitary commander and former leader of the AUC, illustrates how transnational criminal enterprises not only rely on shady characters such as smugglers, traffickers, and dealers (STDs) but also on the complicity of legitimate actors including governments, politicians, military personnel, foreign contractors, and multinational corporations.

ITAGUI, Colombia, August 14 (Reuters) -- Colombia's cocaine trade is much bigger than the government says and will continue to grow on stronger European and Asian demand unless a coherent anti-drugs plan is adopted, a jailed warlord said.

Salvatore Mancuso, once feared throughout northern Colombia for his cocaine-financed paramilitary war against leftist rebels, says Colombia is not serious about cracking down on the drug trade that fuels the four-decade-old insurgency.

Vested interests -- from politicians and military officers who collude with drug smugglers, to contractors connected to a multibillion-dollar U.S. anti-narcotics program, to companies that sell chemicals used to process cocaine -- don't want the war to end, he said. "As long as there is a conflict in Colombia, all this will flourish," Mancuso told Reuters on Monday at a maximum security prison in the mountains outside Medellin.

The ex-leader of the 2,500-member Northern Bloc militia said he ordered a study that shows Colombia produces 960 tonnes of cocaine a year, more than 50 percent above official estimates, and the trade will remain strong as the U.S. cocaine market holds steady and demand grows fast in Europe and China.

Mancuso said he is trying to persuade the U.S. government to listen to his plan for ending the drug trade in this Andean country, but has had little luck so far. He said the U.S.-backed program of fumigating coca plants used to make cocaine is haphazard and that sprayed areas are often retaken by the rebels and replanted. "First we need all-out coca eradication. Second a coherent plan for security and a state presence in these rural areas," Mancuso said. "Then there has to be social and economic development for each community." This would include construction of roads allowing farmers get their legal crops to market. Click here to here the full text.

Photograph courtesy of AFP

Video: One sure-fire way to break up a kitten fight

O.K., I realize that home videos of adorable pets do not really fit with the international and sometimes academic theme of Global Digs, but perhaps this 38-second video of two kittens fighting can actually tell us something more profound about violence and conflict resolution. Maybe, just maybe, this sure-fire way to break up a kitten fight could be adapted for humans and international conflicts. Right? Then again, maybe not...

Tuesday, August 14

Traditional Colombian Dish -- Ajiaco Santaferreño

This delicious traditional Colombian (Bogotá) dish may be prepared in a variety of ways, however it is usually made with the main ingredients of potatoes, chicken, and corn. And every respectable ajiaco absolutely must be accompanied by a side of white rice and avocado. This is a recipe for ajiaco, a hearty soup that is perfect for those cold Bogotá (or Boston) nights.

Ingredients¬
16 cups water (4 cups of water may be substituted for 4 cups of milk)
1 lbs. (500 gr.) new potatoes, pealed, and sliced
2 lbs. (1 Kg.) red potatoes, pealed, and sliced
1 1/2 lbs. (750 gr.) Yukon or white potatoes, pealed, and sliced
3 lbs. (1 1/2 Kg.) chicken breasts
4 Large cobs of corn, cut into chunks (approx. 2 inches wide)
3 stalks of green onion
4 cloves of ground or chopped garlic
1 bunch of quickweed, also called water weed or wild basil (in Spanish, guascas)
1 bunch of cilantro
1 1/2 Cups of creamed milk (in Spanish, crema de leche or nata)
1 cup of capers
4 medium avocados cut in half
Salt and pepper to taste

Preparation¬
First, combine the chicken breasts, potatoes, green onion, salt, and pepper in a large pot and add water and milk (optional). Boil for approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour until the chicken is tender and the potatoes have disintegrated. Meanwhile, boil the corn in a separate pot.

Once the chicken is tender, remove from the pot and set aside. Then, add the cooked corn to the pot and reduce heat to low. Cook the ajiaco on low heat until it achieves the desired thickness.

Add capers 5 minutes before serving. The chicken may be served in the soup or on the side, whole or de-boned. If the chicken is served in the soup, then add it just before serving. Personally, I recommend serving the chicken in the soup with bones removed. Next, add a small amount (2-3 tablespoons) of cream (crema de leche) on top of the soup. Ajiaco Santaferrana is normally served with a side of avocado and rice.

¡Buen provecho!

"War profiteers" undermine reintegration of ex-combatants

Work has been somewhat slow the past few days, however I have had a chance to do some research on "Pablo Sevillano" an ex-paramilitary commander that has agreed to disarm, demobilize, reintegrate into civilian life. In exchange for a lighter prison sentence, this ex-paramilitary and notorious druglord must publicly confess to his crimes. Today he is confessing to crimes that include systematic murders, intimidatation, extortion, and vast ties to the narcotics industry, including the Tijuana Cartel in Mexico.

DDR in Colombia
The demobilization and disarmament of paramilitaries and guerrillas are part of a larger process known as DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration). Disarmament focuses on the collection of weapons whereas demobilization involves the dismantling of military units and transition of ex-combatants from military to civilian life. Reintegration involves the sustainable reinsertion of ex-combatants into civilian life and is arguably the most difficult step. Reintegration is also considered to key to the prevention of new conflicts.

Colombia has gone through many DDR processes over the past 40 years, however none have been able to successfully create durable peace. For my thesis, I would like to research why these efforts have failed and specifically, I would like to understand ways in which illicit "war profiteers" (smugglers, traffickers, dealers, and others) derail the DDR process. My hypothesis is that "war profiteers" engaged in the trade of weapons, drugs, humans, gems, counterfeit money, fake passports, and pirated software, and etc., effectively sidetrack the reintegration of ex-combatants by luring them into these transnational criminal activities. They exploit ex-combatants' extensive military knowledge, unique access to shipping routes, and pre-existing relationships with il/licit businesses dealing in "questionable" goods and promise far greater profits than "normal" civilian life, making the reintegration of former guerillas and paramilitaries all the more difficult.